2 602 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
2 602 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
767 kr
Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar
803 kr
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This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq.
Carl von Clausewitz''s thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, American policy makers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilizing military force to fulfil a clear political objective. The US armed forces bridged the operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfil a political objective. With the end of the Cold War, and an increasing predilection for technological solutions, American policy makers and the military moved away from Clausewitz. It was only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his intrinsic value. However, while many aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the conflict in Iraq can be accommodated within the Clausewitzian paradigm, the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam.
Clausewitz and America will be of great interest to students of strategy, military history, international security and US politics.
803 kr
Läs direkt efter köp
This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq.
Carl von Clausewitz''s thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, American policy makers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilizing military force to fulfil a clear political objective. The US armed forces bridged the operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfil a political objective. With the end of the Cold War, and an increasing predilection for technological solutions, American policy makers and the military moved away from Clausewitz. It was only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his intrinsic value. However, while many aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the conflict in Iraq can be accommodated within the Clausewitzian paradigm, the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam.
Clausewitz and America will be of great interest to students of strategy, military history, international security and US politics.
Gneisenau and the Development of the Prussian Army, 1806-1815
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Europe’s Fate was at Stake is the first comprehensive English-language study of the Prussian field marshal, Count August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (1760–1831). Using primary source material from archives and personal correspondence, as well as previous German studies, including the foundational biographies of Georg Heinrich Pertz and Hans Delbrück, this work brings Gneisenau’s influence on the development of the Prussian army to an English-speaking audience. It shows this development in the context of a life as a practical soldier and military thinker from the army of Frederick the Great through to the Waterloo campaign.
The book takes the reader through the defeat by Napoleon in 1806 and subsequent resistance; the reform of the Prussian army under French occupation until 1812; and the Wars of Liberation between 1813 and 1815, during which Gneisenau served as chief of staff to Prince Gebhard von Blücher.
Overcoming the stereotypical portrayal in pre-1914 German literature of Gneisenau as a dogmatist wedded to decisive battle and the annihilation of the enemy, the work shows how he took a pragmatic approach to the planning and conducting of strategy and operations.